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Aftershocks: Psychotechnics in the wake of apartheid 
 
Ross Truscott and Michelle Smith 
 
I watched the passing colors intently and noticed red passing a few 
times [...] Then I reacted and was surprised when I heard that I had 
been entrapped.1 
 
Introduction 
What we at first found intriguing about Simon Gush’s Red, what the documentary and the 
installation seemed to mutually conjure, was the Mandela car as a body to be mourned.2 
Mourning recurred as a latent theme through the documentary in the interviews with the 
workers at the Mercedes Benz factory – as Phillip Groom described Mandela’s words on 
receiving the car, he stressed that its colour ‘represented the many people that have 
spilled blood in this country to liberate it, to bring it to liberation’, a notion the 
workers seemingly anticipated, as at the factory the Mandela car was, as Groom put it, 
‘literally carried’, like a coffin, not simply a ‘labour of love’, but a work of mourning.3 
Attuned to this, the shell of Gush’s reconstruction of the car body installed within the 
Goethe-Institut gallery in Johannesburg and then outside the Ann Bryant gallery in East 
London seemed to lie like a cadaver on an autopsy trolley (see image in the editor’s 
introduction to this issue). 
 
At the time of Red Assembly, which asked participants to consider the ways in which art 
pressures historical readings, it seemed to us that Red placed itself in relation to 
scholarship on mourning as a threshold condition of post-apartheid sociality.4 The Mandela 
car seemed to present itself as an object of melancholic loss, not an encasing of an already 
lost object, but, as we argued in our paper at Red Assembly, which leaned on Giorgio 
Agamben’s reading of melancholia, as an object shot through by ‘the paradox of the 
intention to mourn that precedes and anticipates the loss of the object’.5 The assemblage 
of the car, we thought, was an anticipatory act that conjured a post-apartheid social 
formation as  lost so  as to  bring it into being, an act attended, we stressed, by rivalry; 
for while the workers interviewed in the documentary spoke of the euphoria of assembling 
the car, it was in fact only after its delivery that worker solidarity fragmented and things in 
the factory went awry. It was, then, we argued, in relation to this fragmentation that Gush’s 
reproduction of the Mandela car, torn apart, should be understood as a questioning of the 
official reconciliatory narrative of the gift these workers offered.  
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Like most of the participants at Red Assembly, we had not seen Red in a gallery, only 
encountered it online. The paper we presented thus dealt with images of Gush’s 
installations from the screen, specifically an image of the bonnet of the car against the 
wall of the Goethe-Institut gallery. In the distorted reflection of this close up of the 
bonnet, we suggested, the gallery floor ran red with the blood that was spilled in the 
factory.6 In this bonnet, we saw the lines of the tiled gallery floor – and the ordered little 
rectangles they made, analogues, perhaps, for the social order of  apartheid  and  its grids of 
intelligibility – bent by the curve  of the metal.  This ‘speculative reproduction’ of the car 
took that order, we thought, and offered a mirror image of a difference necessary to 
imagine a post-apartheid future, an image that the workers themselves had produced, 
through mourning ahead of time what had not yet been realized. Ultimately, though, the 
workers had failed, and in the mirror of the red bonnet we conjured nothing less than an 
echo of the problem of sexual difference upon which the male strikers had stumbled. To 
conclude this by now somewhat rapturous free association, Red recalled, we said, an 
impossible memory of the mother’s body, the first hinge between the subject and the world. 
 
While it seemed necessary at the time to think about sexual difference in relation to 
Red’s scenes of masculinized homosociality, something about this formulation now feels 
forced, even false. But so did each subsequent attempt. Thinking about Red became, for 
us, something like being placed before a test apparatus that consisted of no more than a 
collection of vaguely meaningful, if richly overdetermined, objects that flashed up in front 
of us: it asked us to respond but entrapped us at each turn. If this is what Red became 
for us, though, it did so all of a sudden, later, after Red Assembly, after we had 
unknowingly taken this test many times, each new formulation a more fantastical response 
than the previous ones. This is not to foreclose on any interpretation of Red, for Red was, 
we maintain, the staging of a test that was not unprecedented; indeed, it was a test that 
recalled so many other tests that came to order life under apartheid. It was, in the 
Freudian sense, an uncanny (unheimlich) test, a test ‘which is secretly familiar, which 
has undergone repression and then returned from it’.7 Thus, rather than walk out of 
Red’s test, we want to try to think about the relation between art and tests, and between 
this particular artwork and tests in the history that Red makes available as a repressed 
memory of apartheid to be seized. 
 
Verwoerd’s experiment 
The role of tests in ordering the field of human potential in South Africa is of no small 
importance. Saul Dubow, for instance, has argued that ‘intelligence testing can be seen 
as an essential part of the process that saw the hierarchical ranking of human society in 
terms of racial superiority’.8 Apartheid was rationalized on the grounds of the 
unbridgeable differences between the races, an idea to which psychology lent the weight of 
its disciplinary reason and its arsenal of psychotechnical tests, specifically those assessing 
mental capacities. 
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If Bantu administration ‘gave apartheid its particular institutional form’,9 the labor bureau 
system, as Ivan Evans puts it, was the ‘backbone of  apartheid’.10 The Labor Bureau 
regulated the urban ‘Bantu’ population; its key objective was ‘influx control’, a balance 
between the need for ‘Bantu’ labor in the cities and the requirement that ‘European’ and 
‘Bantu’ live separately. The Labor Bureau thus placed work-seekers in industries with 
labor shortages, kept the urban ‘Bantu’ population at a minimum, and restricted free- 
floating, unemployed ‘Bantu’. Crucial to the labor bureau system was the vocational test 
conducted on work-seekers. But rather than a concern with matching workers with 
suitable employers, vocational tests simply gave the Labor Bureau the polished look of a 
scientific apparatus, upon which its authority rested.11 The test upon which the Labor 
Bureau effectively depended, however, was the pass law system: on the one hand, it was 
upon employment that a pass depended, and on the other, a pass law infringement 
meant that a ‘Bantu’ was rendered suitable to be deployed to farms with labor 
shortages.12 
 
The labor bureau system was formed in 1952 under Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, then 
Minister of Native Affairs, soon to be Prime Minister. But vocational testing had interested 
Verwoerd for some time before that. After completing his doctorate in psychology, Die 
Afstomping van Gemoedsaandoeninge (the blunting of the emotions) at Stellenbosch 
University in 1924, Verwoerd spent time in Leipzig and Berlin. Besides vocational 
testing, his other interests lay in applied psychology, experimental technique, child 
psychology and Völkerpsychologie.13 On his return from Germany, via the US, he became 
Professor of Applied Psychology and Psychotechnics at Stellenbosch University. Given the 
stress laid on the ‘psychological influences’ in the operation of the apartheid state,14 it 
repays the effort to briefly review two experiments Verwoerd conducted during his early 
academic career. 
 
In ‘The distribution of “attention” and its testing’, published in 1928 after his return 
from Germany, Verwoerd wrote of an experiment he conducted wherein he utilized an 
instrument constructed by the Organizations-Institut in Leipzig; an ‘apparatus’, Verwoerd 
notes, ‘which is not only found in the psychological laboratories of German universities 
but is in everyday use for testing the distribution of attention in vocational guidance 
institutes, among others in the Landesberufsamt, Berlin, and the Berufsberatungsstelle, 
Leipzig’.15 This apparatus had been developed to measure the ‘distribution of attention’, 
as the title of his article makes plain. Verwoerd’s aim was to assess if it worked as it claimed 
to. Explaining his procedure, Verwoerd notes that test subjects (‘Os’) were asked to 
respond as quickly as possible to a set of prompts ‘at the rate of 100 per minute’ over a 
period of half an hour.16 This procedure was supplemented by an ‘introspective report’ 
by test subjects, and by ‘observations on the O’s method of performance’.17 Verwoerd’s 
argument is that the test measures, not the ‘distribution of attention, though test 
conditions can be manipulated so that it does, but, rather, what he calls the 
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‘distribution of marginal consciousness and automatic acting’.18 In measuring ‘the 
distribution of attention’, one of the challenges of the experiment is the prevention of 
‘rhythmical reaction’, Verwoerd notes;  to  test  ‘attention’ and the ability of an ‘O’ to 
sustain it over an extended period, the strips must ‘alternate irregularly’, for while 
such ‘rhythmical movements’ might be a measure of ‘the distribution of marginal 
consciousness and automatic acting’, it is not a measure of the ‘distribution of 
attention’, strictly speaking.19 
 
In an article Verwoerd published in 1926, ‘A Method for the Experimental Production 
of Emotions’, he writes of an experiment designed to orchestrate various scenarios 
wherein emotions can be produced under experimental conditions and, thereby, 
studied, noting the effects of ‘blunting’ on the emotion produced.20 Conducted  in  
Afrikaans  before  he  went  to  Germany, though already under the influence of the 
Leipzig school, in this experiment Verwoerd uses a ‘Ranschburg memory-apparatus’, 
with two reaction paddles, one for the experimenter the other for the test subject. 
Test subjects were shown color disks and given a task to perform, their success or 
failure on the task, determined by the experimenter, producing different emotional 
states. After explaining the intricacies of the testing environment, Verwoerd notes how 
he applied punishment ‘by means of shocks from a small inductorium’ to aid the 
production of emotional states.21 In one variation of the shock experiment, ‘Os’ were 
told that they were to shock the ‘E’ for their own mistakes, the ‘inductorium’ handed 
over to the experimental subject in an exchange of roles meant to produce sympathy 
and shame in ‘Os’. But this reversal is, in effect, a false one, always subordinate to the 
experiment’s aim of producing, with rigorous regularity, a particular emotion and being 
able to anticipate its dissipation. 
 
Subjects in these experiments were given strict roles (‘Os’ and ‘Es’), and these 
positions were separated from each other, as Verwoerd states, ‘by means of a 
partition’, with ‘the apparatus [...] placed as far as possible on Es side’.22 It is, thus, 
tempting to read these experiments as having taken place in the laboratories of 
apartheid, statements on its methodology that reveal the outlines of its divisions. 
However, the alarming aspect of Verwoerd’s experiments is not that he trapped and 
shocked his  research  subjects,  for these were students of psychology, colleagues, 
even, perhaps, himself. If apartheid is prefigured here, its lines must be discerned in 
the division between the experimental space and that space beyond which no 
experimentation was thought possible, in the division between experimental 
psychology and Völkerpsychologie. If within the experimental space there are 
‘partitions’, then encircling this hierarchical space are frontiers,  which,  rather  than 
including and differentiating, form the lines along which there occurs a total 
exclusion from the human. Experimental influx control, so to speak, occurred at the 
spatial threshold of the gates of the laboratory itself, for these were tests of what were 
considered to be normal adults capable of introspection. Indeed, Verwoerd places 
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much store in introspection as a method, which, apart from placing his experiments 
historically within psychology’s disciplinary formation in its break from philosophy, 
declares what sort of subject can be included in this community of possible human 
experts, some of whom were shocked. 
 
Verwoerd’s experiments have of course captured academic ‘attention’, so to speak, 
but the claim that the kernels of apartheid might be found in the psychological 
laboratory or in Verwoerd’s interest in Völkerpsychologie is vehemently refuted on 
two points. First, that apartheid was not rationalized on the grounds of the 
Völkerpsychologie Verwoerd may have gleaned while in Germany. And second, that 
Verwoerd rejected outright racial differences in intelligence as measured by 
psychotechnical tests. Moreover, such tests, however much Verwoerd was interested 
in them, had already been critiqued in the 1920s, and by the 1940s Simon 
Bisheuvel, founder of the National Institute for Personnel Research, effectively 
provided the critique of mental testing that would, if not eliminate such tests as 
instruments  of  racial oppression, then at least discredit  this  kind  of  application.23  
Apartheid  cannot be reduced to a single diagram of power, much less to a couple of 
experiments conducted in the early academic career of apartheid’s architect. 
However, what arguments against a possible relation between apartheid and the 
discipline of psychology elide is that what has remained effective, and has left a lasting 
impression, was not the racist content of psychotechnical tests, which had been 
cleansed of their most racist assumptions and, therefore, applications, but the 
armature of the psychotechnical test itself. Empirically correct as they are, such 
refutations forestall an encounter with apartheid as a kind of technological apparatus. 
 
For Verwoerd, in his 1926 experiment, the ‘Ranschburg memory-apparatus’ functions, 
despite its name, as a forgetting-machine, designed to activate working memory but 
suspend all else except the task at hand, intensified by the anticipation of inevitable 
shock. For Verwoerd, there is an immediacy to the reception of shock, a direct 
emotional effect that can be read off the instant reaction of an experimental subject. 
The only delay is that of ‘blunting’, which follows the initial production of an emotion; 
around this emotional reaction, a callous of consciousness, hardened to  shock,  forms. 
According to the conventions of early twentieth century experimental psychology – a 
rigorous thoughtlessness that persists in the discipline – the only concern is  under  
what conditions this  response  can be  reliably  reproduced. It is possible, however, 
that the shocks of Verwoerd’s experiments would only arrive decades later, once he 
left his academic post at Stellenbosch to take up a career in politics. Indeed, if we 
take Verwoerd seriously when he states that his test items ‘show fundamental 
similarity to situations of every-day life’,24 that they are simplified versions of those 
found in the workplace and, one might say, in the shocks of ‘every-day life’, then we 
can understand the predicaments of the post-apartheid as a series of aftershocks both 
yet to cease and yet to arrive, lived in anticipation. 
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The art of testing 
The thinker who has, to our minds, theorized the relation between art and tests most 
provocatively is the German cultural critic, Walter Benjamin. Benjamin was interested in 
vocational tests from the early 1930s. On December 29 1930, Benjamin offered a radio 
broadcast, ‘Carousel of Jobs’, in the context of high unemployment, with low prospects of 
following one’s heart, and many youths satisfied with ‘snatching a spot where the risk of 
slipping back down – the danger of being driven out of the production process – seems as 
low as possible’.25 Benjamin raises, right from the start of this broadcast, ‘the great system 
of tests and manifold methods of evaluation’ that had recently formed a ‘new science, the 
science of work’. What Benjamin is interested in – and he dwells on examples from 
German Occupational Studies, then recently published in Leipzig, and on conversations 
with Hellmuth Bogen, Director of the Berlin Office for Professional Aptitude Tests – is 
the ‘transformative power’ of particular jobs.26 ‘How does the job impact the 
individual, and through what? This is the question to which I would not only like to 
call your attention today, but for which I would also like to ask for your assistance’.27 
Thus, Benjamin asks his listeners to describe how their job has affected them, their 
moods, their attitudes, their relationships and, most of all, how the job has changed 
them. In short, Benjamin asks his listeners to observe themselves and their colleagues 
and to describe the effects they have felt and the transformations they have undergone. 
 
Benjamin is speaking here about the same forms of testing, indeed the tests developed in 
the same institutions, that Verwoerd engages in his vocational test experiment. More 
startling are their common concerns. Indeed,  Benjamin can be read as an unwitting critic 
of Verwoerd’s experiment and, perhaps, of apartheid as it took shape as an unending series 
of unpassable tests. The test would reappear in Benjamin’s now canonical ‘Artwork’ essay, 
wherein he places the vocational test at the heart of the filmic apparatus; the suggestion 
being that ‘the performance of the actor is subjected to a series of optical tests’28 that 
recall ‘vocational aptitude tests’.29 The actor, Benjamin states, performs ‘before a group 
of specialists – executive producer, director, cinematographer, sound recordist, lighting 
designer, and so on – who are in a position to intervene at any time’.30 It is this 
intervention that is characteristic of ‘all test performances’, specifically those ‘conducted 
openly, in agencies for testing professional aptitude’.31  While there is a panel of experts, 
the director assumes particular authority as he ‘occupies exactly the same position as the 
examiner in an aptitude test’.32 
 
The test an actor performs before an ‘examiner’ is one the spectator instantly recognizes, 
Benjamin suggests. If vocational tests had rendered ‘the masses’ as objects of ‘specialist’ 
observation, which had been used to place them into menial jobs, reducing them to 
machine-parts, the constellation of spectator- camera-actor in the cinematic apparatus 
invites an identification with a figure who  has  passed  this  vocational  test,  an  inhabitation  
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of  a  different world through a kind of phantasmatic ‘triumph’. As Benjamin writes in 
the second version of the artwork essay: 
 
Interest in this performance is widespread. For the majority of city dwellers, 
throughout the workday in offices and factories, have to relinquish their humanity in 
the face of an apparatus. In the evening these same masses fill the cinemas, to 
witness the film actor taking revenge on their behalf not only by asserting his 
humanity (or what appears to them as such) against the apparatus, but by placing that 
apparatus in the service of his triumph.33 
 
In the third version of the essay, Benjamin changes tack, arguing that identification 
with the actor on the screen is ‘really an identification with the camera’ and, 
therefore, that the ‘audience takes the position of the camera’.34 The spectator is 
thus placed in the position of an examiner of tests rather than that of a successful 
test subject, a successful job applicant. Without collapsing the difference between 
the second and third versions of the essay, in both texts ‘the masses’, for which such 
tests have come to organize their daily grind, appropriate the vocational test. Like 
the radiobroadcast, in which Benjamin asks his listeners to seize hold of the 
apparatus of the vocational test, film allows for, but does not guarantee, a 
refunctioning of the vocational test that lies both within and behind the apparatus 
of the film, and in everyday life. 
 
Benjamin’s thoughts about tests need to be put into the broader context of his 
work. In ‘Some motifs on Baudelaire’, Benjamin considers the ‘fruitfulness’ of 
Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle ‘in situations far removed from those which 
Freud had in mind’.35 In this essay, the function of consciousness is ‘protection 
against stimuli’.36 While Freud is concerned with war neuroses, shell shock, 
Benjamin sees shock as a more or less permanent and widespread state.37 
Consciousness, for Benjamin reading Freud, is a ‘protective shield’ against the 
shocks of modern life; while shock is repressed by consciousness or rather, in 
Benjamin’s terms, impressed, alienating the subject from their senses and full 
experience (Erfahrung).38 Film, in this context, becomes a kind of ‘protective 
shield’, or, in Susan Buck-Morss’s words, a form of ‘anaesthesia’.39 If the factory 
‘paralyses the imagination of the worker’, its aim being ‘to numb the organism, 
to deaden the senses, to repress memory’, then film participates in this numbing. 
It, however, also holds out another possibility, which resides precisely in filmic 
shock. That is to say, film can claim no distance from modern shock, though it can 
make it useful. 
 
On film and modern shock, Benjamin offers the following enigmatic formulation: ‘In a 
film, perception in the form of shocks was established as a formal principle. That 
which determines the  rhythm  of  production  on  a conveyor belt is the basis of the 
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rhythm of reception in the film’.40 The experience of film and its disjunctive rhythm 
recalls the experience of the worker on the conveyer belt: film repeats industrial 
shock, it numbs, just as work is mind-numbing, it induces  amnesia  and  is  received  
in  a  state  of  distraction. At at the same time, film also holds out another, often 
unrealized, potential: the cinema is a technical apparatus and a social space through 
which repressed memory can return and be made useful to the audience. It is in 
large part in relation to this potential that Benjamin developed his notion of 
‘unconscious optics [das Optisch-Unbewusste]’.41 Just as Freud had, Benjamin notes, 
‘isolated and made analyzable things which had heretofore  floated along unnoticed in 
the broad stream of perception’, so the camera ‘brought about a similar deepening of 
apperception’.42 Resonant with what  Freud called Nachträglichkeit, the 
afterwardness with which the repressed returns, symptomatically, like a 
photographic negative processed, Benjamin’s concept of the ‘optical unconscious’ 
entails a temporality of delay through which that which has left an impression, 
marked the subject, will return suddenly, involuntarily, a reactivation of memory 
inscribed in the temporal structure of shock.43 
 
Here we can note another point at which Benjamin and Verwoerd cross paths. If, for 
Benjamin, consciousness is a ‘protective shield’ against shock, in the logic of 
Verwoerd’s 1926 experiment, consciousness intervenes, blunts the emotion shock 
produces. The major difference between Verwoerd and Benjamin lies in their 
conceptions of the temporality of the shock. While Benjamin’s formulation of shock’s 
delayed arrival – and the messianic currents that pervade his work – cannot be 
collapsed into a psychoanalytic view, his understanding of film does lean on Freud’s 
conception of repression and symptom formation. If, for Freud, a repressed wish,  
always  sexual  in  content, encounters a limit (societal norms and psychic resistance 
to breaching them), then a symptom stands as the synthesis of these two antithetical 
forces – a compromise, a stand in, that offers gratification for that which never 
happened, could not happen.44 For Benjamin, cinema is, in the Freudian sense, a 
symptom. If ‘the desire of contemporary masses to bring things ‘closer’ spatially and 
humanly’ encounters a limit (in the ritual and cult practices surrounding art, in the 
exclusions of auratic perception of painting and the privileges that accrue with it), 
then cinema is the compromise between ‘the urge’, as Benjamin puts it, ‘to get hold 
of an object at very close range’, that grasp offered, like a symptom, ‘by way of its 
likeness, its reproduction’. And yet, as Benjamin insists, this does not render ‘the 
masses’ as symptoms, but analysts.45 
 
An uncanny test 
Benjamin’s treatment of film as a symptom of shock allows us to discern a test lodged in Red. The 
documentary begins with Thembalethu Fikizolo giving an account of the strike at the Mercedes 
Benz factory in 1990, an account that culminates in him missing, by three minutes, the 
deadline to return to work, at which point, he states, management dismissed him without a 
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hearing. The question of time and timing, then, is foregrounded in the documentary from the 
first scene that lasts ten minutes. After this scene, the film cuts to shorter, roughly 
thirty-second snippets of other interviews with plant employees. The timing of the 
cuts that follow, however, remain within the same rhythm as the cuts of the first 
scene. While the interviews may have been conducted in slow ambling conversations, 
the film presents shots timed with the regularity of test items being responded to, 
each item reaching its limit at a minute, though most are completed more quickly, in 
double-time.46 Benjamin’s formulation of ‘the rhythm of production’ and its relation 
to ‘the rhythm of reception in the film’ might be restated here as follows: the rhythm 
of reception at work in the documentary recalls the rhythm of a vocational test. The 
vocational test, properly  speaking,  is  only  a  dramatization of ‘the countless 
mechanized tests’ set for workers.47 As Benjamin notes, these kinds of vocational 
tests, like arriving on time at the gates of the factory, ‘are performed unawares, and 
those who fail are  excluded  from  the work process’,48  as Fikizolo was. 
 
As this first scene is presented, the office in which Fikizolo sits may well have been 
the venue for a vocational test, though he is here on the opposite side of the table, 
the roles exchanged. The other workers interviewed are similarly framed, alone or 
in small groups, giving their observations of the events that unfolded at the 
Mercedes Benz factory, fulfilling Benjamin’s radio broadcast wish, and perhaps 
Gush’s and Cairns’ too, that workers observe themselves, assume the role of 
experts. Of course, this was Verwoerd’s wish, too, the wager of the documentary a 
repetition of Verwoerdian introspection. Perhaps the most poignant observation on 
the ‘transformative power’ of work is Phillip Groom’s description of the main effect 
of working in the Mercedes Benz factory at the time of the strike: ‘When you come 
to work, we used to say you leave your brains by the gate’. The shots to which the 
camera cuts during interviews are always from outside of the gates of the factory, 
precisely where the workers had abandoned their thought. In this way, while these 
still-like images to which the camera cut induced a state of distraction, they also, at 
the same time, framed these accounts as thoughtful. On the screen of Red, then, 
are ‘actors’ playing themselves and ‘taking revenge’, as Benjamin puts it, ‘against 
the apparatus’; actors, with which the viewer is invited to identify, describing the 
faultless assemblage of Mandela’s car in record time, without supervision, passing 
a vocational test with flying colors.49 But through identification with the camera, 
the spectator becomes, also, an examiner of these examinations of the events, the 
spectator as an examiner face to face with other examiners, separated by the 
‘partition’ of the screen. If the film comes across as flat in certain respects, it is 
precisely in this horizontality that its political claim is staged. 
 
In Red as it was installed at the Ann Bryant, the theme of time and timing 
reappeared, perhaps by chance. In the second room of the gallery, the door panels of 
the car were suspended on the wall (figure 1). 
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If this was a test item – the panels different shades of red, perhaps one of them  a  
trap,  as  Verwoerd  set  traps  with  similar  colored  discs  – the  clock against the wall 
kept time.50 
 
 
 
If art galleries have always been to some degree tests of proper modes of ‘civilized’ 
looking, the viewer who is observed here has the added pressure of being timed, of 
being watched, as it were, by the clock which stands on the threshold of these two 
rooms. The crucial difference, however, between Red and Verwoerd’s tests, is that 
Red exhibited the test for all to see. Displays of vocational tests are not 
insignificant, for these kinds of tests and their traps are usually concealed – they 
are ‘incapable of being publically exhibited to the degree one would desire’, as 
Benjamin notes.51 Red’s exhibited test still affected the viewer, entrapped, 
shocked, interpellated, though the frame of the gallery inserted a critical 
distance from the test, offered a location from which to apprehend the conditions of 
the test, to respond to the ‘watchman’ in the corner.52 
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In light of our reading of Verwoerd’s experiments, the questions that haunt us after 
the shocks of Red’s test do not concern who the reverberations of Verwoerd’s 
experiment electrify and who not. Put differently, we are cautious of collapsing  the  
difference  between  oppression  and  repression,  between  the excluded  and  the  
unthinkable.  Though  issues  surrounding  Red’s  politics  of inclusion are certainly 
there to be interrogated, our questions concern Red’s mediation  of  a memory  of 
tests.  How  did  Red’s spatiality  recall  Verwoerd’s psychotechnical experiments? How 
did the partitions and frontiers that organized Verwoerd’s experiments reappear in 
Red, repeated but also reworked? ision between the ethnological field and the 
experimental space ision between the ethnological field and the experimental space 
become the documentary and the installation, factory and gallery? Is Red to Verwoerd’s 
experiment what certain forms of early cinema were to the shocks of industrial modernity 
for Benjamin? And can the assemblage of the Mandela car be grasped as an attempt by the 
workers to seize hold of the apparatus of the test, to reverse the roles, to exert some control 
over the product of their labour? Did the exchange of roles – workers not only passing but 
examining – end up being a part of the game, in which the workers were not only to 
assemble the car for free, but also produce an emotional response to the act of making it, 
on which Mercedes Benz as a company could reflect and report? Did the Mercedes Benz 
factory find itself in the maze of a Verwoerdian experiment? And if what we are doing here 
is observing and reflecting on that response, is this not also our wager? 
 
Left with these questions, which we can only pose here, our overarching concern is what one 
does with an installation that holds and withholds within its body, if not a memory of tests 
with the capacity to hierarchize life, then at least questions of such tests. What is the 
proper home for such an uncanny test, if it can be called that? The actual Mandela car 
assembled by the workers has been housed in the Apartheid Museum to be remembered 
and, simultaneously, forgotten as a prop in reconciliatory nation building. But neither 
the museum nor the gallery seem as appropriate as the university, specifically the 
University of Fort Hare, as the site at which the body of Red will come to rest. Fort Hare is 
an institution at which tests have been resisted; indeed, at the same time as Verwoerd was 
conducting his experiments, D.D.T. Jabavu, writing from Fort Hare, states: ‘We scarcely 
need to mention the general failure of intelligence tests that were in fashion a few years 
ago, seeking to discredit the mentality of aboriginal Africans’.53 The point is not that we 
ought to reject the test, as Jabavu does, for in his own words Jabavu examines and then 
fails these tests. Which is to say, there is no walking out on this test one is always already 
taking. And like Verwoerd’s research subject we cite in our epigraph, there was no failing 
Red’s test that entrapped and shocked us at each turn. To fail, as we did several times and 
as we do here, again, is already to have passed into a space where one is presumed to be a 
fully human introspective subject.54 
 
The buried, the repressed, of the post-apartheid is apartheid’s psychotechnical test, which 
continues to organize and orient the present, to ‘partition’ and to apportion life and 
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death, to affirm, in the hollowed out  space of introspective reflection, a notion of 
humanness the origins of which we cannot recall. There is, then, a question of inclusion and 
exclusion, but this question has on its horizon a memory of the mechanisms through which 
the human has been produced. Red intervenes by attempting to make that memory 
available in and as the staging of an uncanny double of the test, Red as an uncanny 
double of Verwoerd’s test, particularly the experimental vocational test and all those 
vocational tests that operate outside of awareness in ‘situations of every-day life’. This 
hypothesis, however, if we can call it that, will not yield to an empirical test; there is no 
paper trail that runs from Stellenbosch through the labor bureau system to East London.  
If t he post-apartheid  is  in  the  aftershocks of Verwoerd’s  experiment, and  if  Red can 
be read as an uncanny double that brings this to light, it has to be approached 
symptomatically; Red as a symptom – in the strong sense of the term – of the 
repression of apartheid that began, it has been argued, almost the moment apartheid 
was named as such.55 
 
If Red was an uncanny test assembled and exhibited in a home, the Ann Bryant 
gallery, which is no longer a home, Freud does not hold the key to the  problem.56 
In his essay on the uncanny, Freud is absolutely certain that fears of mechanical 
doubles are not essential to the experience of the uncanny; a car body mistaken for a 
corpse, a clock for an  ‘E’,  these  can  be  uncanny, Freud argues, only insofar as they 
represent repressed wishes and surmounted beliefs, only insofar as  they  recall  the  
‘primitive’.  This is Freud at his most reductive, seeing in human-machine relationships 
only the confirmation of psychoanalytic concepts. It is, however, precisely by  taking  
seriously the agency of the apparatus – as Benjamin did, tracing the changes in 
sense perception and memory made possible by the technological reproducibility of art 
– that we might be able to apprehend the ways in which apartheid lodged the 
technology of the test at the heart of the human and produced racialized inhumanity 
beyond the gates of the testable. 
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Notes 
1 Research subject in H.F. Verwoerd, “A Method for the  Experimental  Production 
of Emotion,” 358. 
2  On background to Red and Red Assembly, see the editors’ introduction to this issue. 
3  Gush and Cairns, Red. 
4 Mark Sanders, for example, argues that apartheid was, and remains, ‘a 
proscription on mourning, specifically of the other’, the corollary of which is that 
‘apartheid would be undone through condolence’. Sanders, “Remembering 
Apartheid.” 60.  See also Coetzee, “The Mind of Apartheid,” 1-2. 
5  Agamben, Stanzas, 20. 
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6 Thembalethu Fikizolo evoked these associations when he stated that at the time of 
the  strike there was ‘blood, literally,  on the shop floor’. Indeed, blood is invoked in 
the documentary at least twice more. 
7  Freud, “The Uncanny,” 637. Though there is a different sort of uncanny, too; 
it is not only the repressed returned, but also a set of beliefs ‘surmounted’ recurring, 
that which   one   does   not   believe   any   longer being confirmed. Freud, “The 
Uncanny,” 639. Interestingly, the artist’s trap is exactly what Freud is concerned 
with in his essay on the ‘uncanny [das Unheimliche]’, the way both lived experience 
and aesthetics induces a ‘quality of feeling’ the ‘shade’ of fright. Freud, “The 
Uncanny,” 620, 641. 
8   Dubow, Scientific Racism, 211. 
9  Evan, Bureaucracy, 17. 
10   Ibid., 102. 
11   See Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 183-184. 
12   Ibid., 184. 
13 Völkerpsychologie is sometimes translated as ethno-psychology, though we leave it 
untranslated here. 
14  Evans, Bureaucracy, 57. 
15   Verwoerd,  “The  Distribution  of  ‘attention,’” 495. 
16   Ibid., 497-498. 
17   Ibid., 497-498. 
18   Ibid., 501. 
19   Ibid., 505, n. 
20  Verwoerd, “A method.” 
21   Ibid., 357. 
22   Ibid., 358. 
23 See Marx, “Hendrik Verwoerd,” 91; Miller, “Science and Society,” 638, 639-640, 650; 
Dubow, Scientific Racism, 218. 
24   Verwoerd, “A method,” 369. 
25   Benjamin, Radio Benjamin, 367. 
26 Ibid., 374. Benjamin’s interest in experiments came largely from his engagement with 
Brecht’s conception of experimental epic theatre. 
27   Ibid., 374. 
28  Benjamin, Illuminations, 228. 
29   Ibid., 246, n. 
30   Benjamin, The Work of Art, 30. 
31   Ibid., 31. 
32   Ibid., 31. 
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33   Ibid., 31. 
34 Benjamin, Illuminations, 228. Benjamin also shifts much of the discussion of ‘tests’ to 
the endnotes, probably at Adorno’s insistence. 
35   Ibid., 160. 
36   Ibid., 160. 
37   Ibid., 162. 
38 Erfahrung is to be differentiated from  Erlebnis, to merely live through something. As 
Hansen notes, etymologically rooted in fahren and Gefahr, journeying and danger 
respectively, Erfahrung ‘stresses the subject’s precarious mobility rather than a stable 
position of perception vis-a-vis an object’. Hansen, Cinema and Experience, loc 173. 
39 Buck-Morss, “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics,”18. 
40  Benjamin, Illuminations, 175. 
41   Ibid., 235. 
42   Ibid., 235. 
43   Ibid., 255. 
44 Freud, “Introductory lectures,” 299. 
45  Benjamin, Illuminations, 223. 
46 After two minutes of Fikizolo talking, interrupted only by a stitched cut at fifty seconds, 
the camera  goes to an image  of the sea, and then, roughly every thirty seconds the shot 
changes to different images of harbor scenes, scenes outside the factory, at the loading 
docks, and back to the sea (to be precise, the average shot is twenty six seconds long, 
cutting twenty two times in ten minutes). 
47   Benjamin, The Work of Art, 30. 
48   Ibid., 30. 
49 In the documentary, almost all employees interviewed discuss how quickly it was built 
without faults. Gush and Cairns, Red. 
50   This    was    in    fact    how    Verwoerd 
entrapped his research subjects. A disc of a particular color would signal, ahead of time, 
that a reaction would soon be required. If the signal were a red disc with two dots and 
three lines, the trap would be red with three dots and two lines. Thus anxiety was induced 
through different shades of red. 
51  Benjamin, The Work of Art, 30, emphasis added. 
52 With the ‘watchman’ we are of course invoking Freud’s spatial analogy for repression. 
Freud, “Introductory Lectures,” 295-296. 
53   Jabavu, “Higher education,” 934-936. 
54 Of course, Red Assembly–academics gathered on the top floor of the gallery, thinking 
about Red–confirmed that status, but also, in different ways, questioned it. 
55  Verwoerd himself, in his ‘attempts to whitewash the rhetoric of racism’ for ‘the 
world at large’, displaced apartheid with ‘separate development’, racial difference with 
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national difference. This would be followed by another repressive turn of the screw in 
official rhetoric under B.J. Vorster, ‘plural democracy’ displacing ‘multi-nationalism’, which 
by the 1980s under P. W. Botha had been ‘purged of open references to race’. McClintock 
and Nixon, “No Names Apart,” 143. 
56    The unheimlich, the unhomely, the unfamiliar, is precisely heimlich, homely, ‘that class 
of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long familiar’. Freud, “The 
Uncanny,” 620.  We  missed, on that first test at Red Assembly where we invoked the 
mother’s body, the connection Freud makes between the uncanny and the mother’s body, 
that ‘place where each one of us once lived once upon a time and in the beginning’. 
Freud, “Uncanny,” 637. 
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